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Abstract 
 
This article estimates for member states of the EU the effect of low levels 
of turnout on parties’ share of the vote in national elections. It does so by 
comparing the distribution of party choices in national elections for all those who 
participate in those elections on the one hand, and for the much more restricted 
group of those who participate in European Parliament elections on the other. As 
European elections register lower turnout than other nation-wide elections, this 
comparison provides an extreme, but empirically observed case of low turnout. 
Turnout effects prove comparatively small, and are non-negligible in only few 
cases. Turnout effects are slightly different for different kinds of parties: right-wing 
parties benefit slightly from them (on average) and left-wing parties are (on 
average) somewhat hurt. Although significant, these differences are exceedingly 
small, and explain no more than a few percent of variation in turnout effects. No 
significant effects are found from other party characteristics (such as their size, 
government status, position on European integration, or interactions of these with 
government approval or time since the last national election). The analyses are 
based on data from European election studies in 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004.  
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Introduction 
 
The lower the level of turnout in an election, the more often do we see politicians 
and commentators proclaim that this affected parties’ fortunes in that election. 
Some parties are believed to be disadvantaged, others to have benefited from 
low turnout. The tendency to attribute parties’ vote shares (in part) to low turnout 
is particularly strong when the outcome of the election is considered to be 
‘surprising’, which usually means that it deviates from someone’s prior 
expectation. If the interpretation of election results as dependent on levels of 
turnout were justified, this would diminish the effectiveness of low-turnout 
elections as channels to communicate the political preferences of a population. 
This is often the subtext underneath the explanation given by politicians of parties 
that fared poorly. But, to what extent, and in which circumstances are such 
interpretations justified?  
 In this paper we argue that second-order national elections may provide 
excellent venues for systematically investigating turnout effects, because turnout 
in such elections is usually considerably lower than in (first-order) national 
parliament elections. Survey studies make it possible to compare party 
preferences of the (restricted) group that actually cast their ballots in second-
order elections with those of the (usually much larger) group of those who 
participate in first-order national elections (or indicate that they would do so). We 
will illustrate this by focusing on elections to the European Parliament, which of 
all second-order national elections are the ones that typically generate the lowest 
turnout in their respective countries. This focus provides us not only with an 
opportunity to investigate parties’ electoral success at sometimes extremely low 
but nevertheless actual levels of turnout, it also provides us with a larger number 
of observations than single national contexts would, thus allowing us to escape 
the idiosyncrasies of a single party or a single election context and to assess 
general patterns instead.  
In the remainder of this paper we first describe our research design. This 
involves elaborating the reasons for choosing European elections as a venue for 
studying turnout effects, and specifying our approach for measuring these 
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effects. In this same context we describe the empirical data on which our 
analyses are based. We then report the magnitude of the turnout effects that we 
find, and how they vary between countries and election years. This descriptive 
analysis is the stepping-stone to a multivariate analysis aimed at explaining 
variations in turnout effects between parties and contexts. We conclude with 
some reflections on the political implications of low turnout, and on European 
elections as mechanisms of expressing the party preferences of populations. 
 
 
European elections as venues to observe turnout effects 
 
European elections are so-called second-order national elections (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980; also Reif 1997 and Marsh 1998). Such elections are characterized 
by the national political arena being dominant over the specific political arena for 
which the election is ostensibly meant, i.e. the European one. The distinction 
between first-order and second-order elections is particularly that the latter do not 
have direct consequences for the allocation of government power. In this respect 
there is less ‘at stake’, a difference that goes a long way in explaining the large 
differences in turnout between various elections, including turnout differences 
between European and national parliamentary elections.1  
Election studies of second-order national elections provide excellent 
venues for studying the extent to which parties’ strengths are affected by 
differential turnout, particularly when such studies contain information about party 
choice in elections to the national parliament.  The uniquely useful aspect of the 
context of European Parliament elections is that actually observed levels of 
turnout are invarably lower —often very much lower— than in elections to the 
national parliament, while the character of electoral participation in both kinds of 
elections is the same. The level of turnout in European elections can therefore 
                                                 
1 For an exhaustive and definitive discussion on the relationship between turnout on the one hand 
and ‘what is at stake’, see Franklin (2004). Rivalling interpretations of low turnout in European 
elections that interpret non-voting as an expression of opposition to or lack of trust in European 
integration are not supported by empirical evidence, as will be discussed below.  
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sensibly be regarded as a realistic lower boundary for turnout at a given place 
and time.2 This allows a valid comparison of party preferences of the restricted 
group who actually cast their votes in a low-turnout context with the (usually 
much larger) group of those who vote in a national parliamentary election. We will 
elaborate this argument below. 
A necessary condition for considering electoral participation and turnout in 
European elections and in national first-order elections to be of the same kind, is 
that the major actors — the citizens who are eligible to vote and the political 
parties— are the same in both.3 For all practical purposes, this condition is 
satisfied, possibly with a few exceptions of minor relevance.4  
Those eligible to vote —we will refer to this group as the electorate— can 
in principle be quite different in European and in national elections, owing to the 
fact that European citizens have the right to vote in the EU country in which they 
reside, even when not holding citizenship. This possibility does not exist in first-
order elections, which require that one holds the nationality of the country in 
question. This potential discrepancy between the electorates in national and in 
European elections is, however, negligible, with the possible exception of 
Luxembourg.  
The political parties that are listed on the ballot in European elections are 
usually the same as the parties that traditionally contest national elections, even 
                                                 
2 Our argument here is that electoral participation is of the same nature in European elections 
and in national parliamentary elections. It is not required that the character of party choice is 
identical in both kinds of elections, as will be explained below. Indeed, it could be argued that 
there may be more ‘sincere’ voting when there is ‘less at stake’ (see, e.g., Van der Eijk and 
Oppenhuis 1990). Whether or not this is the case, is immaterial for our procedure to assess 
turnout effects, as we do not compare choice in European elections with choice in national 
parliament elections.  
3 An additional requirement would be that the rules of the game —the electoral systems used in 
national and European elections— are identical, or at least not sufficiently different to generate 
differential turnout among the potential supporters of the various parties. It has to be noted that 
electoral systems do indeed differ between the two kinds of elections, in ways that are likely to 
affect party choice and political representation (cf Oppenhuis et al. 1996; Farrell & Scully 2002). 
We see no reason, however, for these differences to generate differential effects for parties, nor 
do we know of analysts who have suggested that they do. 
4 That the electorate and the party system are the same in both kinds of elections may well be 
regarded as implied in the concepts of first- and second-order elections. In order to avoid that the 
veracity of our findings would be contingent on accepting our interpretation of European elections 
as predominantly second-order in character we support our contention with empirical evidence. 
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using the same names. There are some noteworthy exceptions to this rule. In 
some countries, such as France, the national parties that vie for votes in 
European elections do so occasionally under different names than those by 
which they are known domestically. As a case in point, in 1994 the Front National 
was listed on the ballot as Liste contre l’Europe de Maastricht, Allez la France!, 
but all indications are that ordinary French voters knew exactly which of their 
well-known national parties was designated by these different names on the 
ballot.5 A real exception to the rule that the same parties compete for votes in 
national and European elections exists in Denmark, where two lists only compete 
in European elections, and not in national ones: the Folkebevægelsen and the 
Juni Bevægelsen (see also Worre 1996).6 As a consequence, estimates of 
turnout effects in Denmark may be less pertinent to our argument than those 
from other countries.7  
In addition to well-established national parties it is quite common for new 
parties to be on the ballot in European elections. In our view these do not really 
constitute an exception to the rule that voters are confronted with the same party 
system in both kinds of elections. On the contrary, the very fact that almost 
without exception the successful ones of these newcomers subsequently attempt 
to establish themselves as national political parties by competing in national 
elections underscores our contention that what is on offer to voters is the same in 
both kinds of elections, with the only real exceptions existing in Denmark.8  
                                                 
5 This difference in party names is rarely ever mentioned in analyses of voter behavior in 
European elections, and analysts customarily compare results in European and first-order 
national elections as if all parties used the same name in both contests. This habit extends to 
well-known local analysts, which suggests that ordinary citizens were well aware of the identity of 
the various lists, a suggestion that is supported by a wealth of survey data. See, e.g. Lodge 
(1996) and Gruenberg et al. (2000).  
6 The Junilistan in Sweden, which shares the Euroskeptic orientation of the two Danish lists, 
participated for the first time in the 2004 European elections and won 3 seats in the European 
Parliament. In contrast to its Danish counterparts, however, the list has announced its intention of 
taking part in the elections to the national parliament.  
7 The substantive results of the analyses reported later in this article are not affected, however, 
when Denmark is omitted from the analyses.  
8 Our proposition does not imply that the choices on offer to voters are identical over time. Party 
systems evolve over time as new parties spring up, old ones split up, disappear, merge etc. But 
the party system that presents itself to the voters at any given moment is not systematically 
different in national and European elections, with the exception of Denmark. 
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The equality of electorates and party systems is, as stated, only a 
necessary condition for considering electoral participation in European and 
national elections as truly comparable phenomena —and thus to use European 
elections to identify the group of voters in a low turnout context on the basis of 
observed behavior. For electoral participation to be comparable in both contexts 
it is also necessary that the determinants of electoral participation are identical in 
both kinds of elections. If citizens’ decisions to turn out to vote or not would in 
different elections be motivated by different kinds of considerations, then it would 
make little sense to use the context of European elections to learn much about 
the political effects that differential turnout may have in national elections. The 
most obvious kind of difference that one can imagine to exist between 
determinants of electoral participation in European end national elections is 
opposition to or lack of trust in European integration as a motivation for non-
voting in European elections that has no relevance in national elections.  
With respect to the question whether or not low turnout is caused by Euro-
skeptic attitudes, we find two different approaches in the literature. The first does 
not find any evidence of such attitudes and opinions. Schmitt and Mannheimer, in 
their analysis of the 1989 European Election Study data, find that participation in 
European Parliament elections is virtually unrelated to attitudes about European 
integration. In 1989 at least, electoral participation was mostly a matter of 
habitual voting —“people went to the polls because they are used to doing so on 
election day” (1991: 50). Later analyses based on the same 1989 European 
Election Study included not only individual level factors but also systemic and 
contextual characteristics and their interaction with individual-level variables (see 
Oppenhuis 1995; Franklin et al. 1996). Again, attitudes about European 
integration and the European Community were found to be virtually irrelevant to 
lower turnout in European elections.9 The second approach, however, does claim 
                                                 
9 This negative result seems to be quite unpalatable for people who are emotionally attached to 
the conventional wisdom of politicians and journalists that non-participation must indicate lack of 
support for European integration. Smith, for example, is one of those who after correctly noticing 
that „Franklin, van der Eijk and Oppenhuis have challenged the sort of claims made in this section 
...” dismisses these results and contends without any empirical evidence or argument whatsoever 
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that Euroskepticism affects turnout. Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson conducted an 
extensive study of electoral participation in the 1994 elections to the European 
Parliament. In contrast to the conclusions about the 1989 elections referred to 
above, Blondel et al. conclude “voluntary Euro-abstention to be significantly 
affected by attitudes to European integration, by attitudes to the European 
Parliament, and by attitudes to the parties and candidates in the election, and 
that it is not significantly affected by second-order considerations and 
calculations” (Sinnott 2000: 70, summarizing Blondel et al. 1998: 222-236).  
As this seemingly conflicting evidence is based on different election years, 
Schmitt and van der Eijk (forthcoming) extended these analyses to include three 
different European election years: 1989, 1994 and 1999. In addition, they analyze 
the research design of both approaches. Their empirical analyses reaffirm the 
earlier finding that low levels of turnout in European elections cannot be 
attributed to voters’ feelings of support of or opposition to European integration. 
The quite different interpretation by Blondel et al. is caused by defects in their 
research design and by under-specification of their explanatory model.10 In 
conclusion, and returning to our concerns in this paper, we see no indication in 
the existing empirical literature for suspecting electoral participation in European 
and in national elections to be qualitatively different.  
Finally, our contention that voting participation in European and national 
elections are of the same kind is strongly affirmed by the recurrent finding that 
                                                                                                                                                 
that “... Despite their skepticism it seems that attitudes do have a part to play in explaining 
behavior in EP elections” (1999, p. 123, footnote 10).  
10 The design and analyses by Blondel et al. are plagued by three major problems, each of which 
undermines the substantive validity of their main conclusions. First, many of their analyses are 
marred by selection bias (i.e. by deleting groups of cases that are selected on their values on the 
dependent variable). Second, in their multivariate analysis of electoral participation they fail to 
control for habitual (non)voting, which results in misattributing causal effects. Finally, and related 
to the second problem, they do not take into account that survey questions that ostensibly tap 
attitudes towards ‘Europe’ are not Europe-specific at all but rather indicators of more generic 
latent political orientations; they are equally related to electoral participation in European and in 
national elections and can therefore not be interpreted as distinct explanations of turnout in 
European elections (cf van der Eijk 1984).  
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both behaviors reflect a single underlying behavioral dimension that is of equal 
relevance to the context of national and to the context of European elections.11  
The empirical findings summarized above have important implications. 
First, the differences between voters and non-voters in European elections are of 
the same nature as those between voters and non-voters in national elections. 
This makes it possible to consider the low levels of turnout in European elections 
as actually observed (hence not imaginary) lower boundaries of electoral 
participation in the EU member states.12 This, in turn, allows us to assess turnout 
effects in first-order national elections by comparing the distribution of party 
choice for national parliament elections of only those who participated  in 
European elections with the distribution of those same choices of the much larger 
group that turns out to vote in elections for national parliament.13 Because the 
difference in turnout between European and national elections is larger than 
between national elections only, our basis of comparison provides us more 
statistical leverage to uncover systematic differences in how parties are affected 
by low turnout.  
 
 
The measurement of turnout effects 
 
Our interest in the political consequences of turnout variations implies that our 
units of analysis are parties. When estimating turnout effects we want to know 
                                                 
11  We find that electoral participation in European and in national elections are very strongly 
homogeneous, that is, that they are manifest indicators of a single underlying latent trait. In other 
words, they are qualitatively the same, and differ only in terms of their ‘difficulty’. These analyses 
are based on the application of Mokken scaling (a versatile form of stochastic cumulative scaling). 
They have been reported by van der Eijk (1984), and were confirmed at subsequent European 
elections. For the method of Mokken scaling see Mokken (1971), Niemöller and Van Schuur 
(1983) and Van Schuur (2003).  
12 The notion of a lower boundary is based on the empirical observation that, almost without 
exception, turnout in European elections falls below the level of turnout in any other nation-wide 
second-order election such as elections for municipal and regional councils.  
13 Similarly, it would in principle be possible to estimate turnout effects in the results of European 
elections by comparing the choices of those who actually voted in European elections with the 
choices in that election had a higher lever of turnout been achieved. This requires information 
about the choice that non-voters in European elections would have made had they turned out to 
vote. As such information is not available, we focus in this article on turnout effects in national, 
first-order elections.  
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what each party’s proportion of the vote would be at different levels of turnout. 
The differences between these proportions are the turnout effects that we are 
interested in. We obtain our observations from surveys that ask all respondents 
about their party choice in first-order national elections, and that also allow us to 
distinguish between those who actually voted in a European election and those 
who did not. The difference between on the one hand a parties’ (first-order) vote 
share among all national voters, and on the other hand its (first-order) vote share 
among the much smaller number of voters that did participate in the European 
Parliament elections yields the desired information. For each of the parties it 
states how much larger (or smaller) its proportion of votes in a national 
parliamentary election would be if turnout in national elections were to drop to the 
observed level of a European election, in other words if participation in the 
national elections were to be limited to only those voters who participated in the 
EP election.  
 As our source of empirical information we use the European Election 
Studies (EES) of 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. These studies consist of sample 
surveys of the electorates of each of the member states of the European Union in 
the respective years, conducted immediately following the European elections in 
those years.14 The studies included questions about intended electoral 
participation and party choice in national elections ‘were those to be conducted 
tomorrow’ and about electoral participation and party choice in the European 
election. Our measure of turnout effects is based on (intended) party choice in 
national elections— the distribution of which is compared for different groups, 
which are distinguished on the basis of reported electoral participation in the 
European election. This implies that our comparison is entirely based upon 
empirical observations, not on some form of modeling.15  
                                                 
14 These studies have been deposited in data archives such as the ZA (Cologne), Steinmetz 
Archives (Amsterdam), and the ICPSR (Ann Arbor) and can be used freely for secondary 
analysis. Supporting documentation and auxiliary information —including the composition of the 
workgroup in various years, funding agencies and publications based on these data—can be 
obtained from http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net  
15 A slightly different strategy would have been to focus on reported party choice in the most 
recent national elections instead of intended party choice in national elections ‘were those to be 
conducted tomorrow’. We considered that a less attractive option, first because it would by 
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As an illustrative example, we present in Table 1 the observations that 
lead to the estimated turnout effects for Germany in 1999. The columns under 
the heading ‘intended NE behavior’ reflect the responses to the question how 
respondents would vote in national elections ‘were those to be held tomorrow’. 
These columns distinguish between the respondents who did not vote in the 
European elections and those who did. Note that these columns also reflect that 
some respondents stated that they would not turn out to vote in national 
elections. In the next set of columns (‘NE vote shares’) we omitted the intended 
non-voters, because only the votes that are (or will be) cast are relevant in the 
determination of the outcome of an election. The second column of this set of 3 
(labeled ‘EE voters’) shows the distribution of NE party preferences for only those 
people who stated that they had participated in the European election. The third 
column shows the distribution of party preferences for EE voters and non-voters 
combined, i.e., all respondents who indicated a choice of party in a national 
election (and who thus indicated that they would not abstain in a national 
election). The final column (‘turnout effect’) is the difference between the two 
previous columns.16  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Before presenting our analyses, a few comments have to be made in 
order to prevent misunderstanding. First, our estimates of turnout effects do not 
reflect the contrast in choices between EE voters and EE non-voters. Those 
differences (which are visible in Table 1 in the columns headed ‘Intended NE 
behavior’) are of interest when comparing various categories of the electorate. In 
our case, we are primarily interested in parties, as the argument that election 
                                                                                                                                                 
necessity omit from the analyses first-time voters at the time of a European election, who tend to 
participate less than other cohorts (cf Franklin 2004), and who can thus contribute more than 
others to turnout effects. Moreover, a focus on choice in the last national election runs the risk of 
being affected by memory distortions which are particularly pronounced among those who 
change in preference (cf Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983). This would lead to conflating two 
different phenomena: actual turnout effects on the one hand, and changes in party preferences in 
the period between the last national elections and the current European elections.  
16 We calculated turnout effects in this way only for parties that hold seats in the national 
parliament of a country or in the European parliament. We leave out smaller parties, as for them 
these estimates would be very unstable owing to the small numbers of respondents on which 
they would be based.  
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outcomes are affected by turnout is an argument that centers on vote shares of 
parties. The estimate of changes in a party’s vote share as a consequence of 
turnout differences involves the comparison of 2 distributions of vote shares that 
are overlapping (the columns ‘EE voters’ and ‘Total’). Because of this overlap the 
contrast between these distributions is less pronounced than the contrast 
between the non-overlapping groups of EE-voters and EE-nonvoters. As a case 
in point, we find that the CDU-CSU is much more popular amongst those who 
voted in the European election than amongst those who did not: the difference is 
14.9 percent. Yet, the advantage that accrued to the CDU-CSU in term of vote 
share because of this much higher popularity amongst voters was a paltry 1.9%. 
This ‘muting’ will be stronger, the larger the group of voters is compared to the 
group of voters that only participates in national parliamentary elections.  
Secondly, our estimates of turnout effects pertain to party choice in 
national elections, not to party choice in European elections. Those choices are 
not identical, and we can thus not derive from the analyses presented here how 
parties would have fared in European elections had turnout been higher in those 
elections.17 Our analyses yield, however, relevant information to address such 
questions as well, and we will return to them at the end of this paper.  
 
 
Descriptive analyses 
 
How large are the differences in parties’ shares of the votes that would result 
from a decline of turnout in national elections from their ‘normal’ levels to those 
                                                 
17 The actual choices that voters make in European and national parliamentary elections are not 
necessarily the same. As stated above, European and national elections differ in ‘what is at stake’ 
(i.e., the allocation of executive power), and this difference affects voters mainly in two ways. 
First, because there is less at stake in European elections, turnout is lower. Second, because 
there is less at stake party choice in European elections is less influenced by strategic 
considerations that operate in national elections, while the importance of expressive 
considerations is larger in European elections. This yields differences in choice that can be most 
directly observed in those countries where European and domestic elections are conducted 
concurrently. In non-concurrent situations, these differences can be estimated from relevant 
survey data (cf. van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1990; Oppenhuis et al. 1996; van Egmond 
forthcoming; see also footnote 12, above).  
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obtained in European elections? Table 2 presents the average of the absolute 
turnout effects in the member states of the EU in 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004.18 
Table 2 shows quite limited (average) magnitudes of turnout effects: their 
average (absolute) magnitude over all years and all countries is 1.3%. In other 
words: vote shares of political parties in national parliament elections would on 
average change (in either a positive or a negative direction) by 1.3% if turnout in 
national elections would be depressed to the level observed in European 
elections. To put this in a relevant perspective, we also indicated in Table 2 how 
large the combined electoral consequences of these effects are for a country, 
which we expressed in the so-called Pedersen index. This measure is defined as 
half of the sum of all absolute differences in parties’ vote shares between two 
elections (or, in this case, between two distributions of vote shares).19 We find 
distinct variations between countries, which are particularly related to the turnout 
difference between a European and the most recent national election (we will 
return to this in our multivariate analyses, below).  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Averaged across all countries and elections, the extent of electoral change 
(expressed in terms of the Pedersen index) generated by these turnout effects is 
4.8%, which is quite limited in comparison to the average net electoral change of 
13% that can be observed between consecutive (first-order) elections in Western 
European countries in the 1990s (Mair 2002a,b). If turnout differences between 
national elections were of the same magnitude as those between national and 
European elections, than approximately one third of the actual electoral 
fluctuations between successive national elections could be attributed to turnout 
effects. As turnout differences between first-order elections are actually much 
smaller, we can only conclude that only a fraction of the electoral changes 
between consecutive national elections can be attributed to variations in turnout.  
                                                 
18 We deleted Luxembourg from the analyses because a reliable estimate of turnout effects is 
hindered by the combination of small sample size, compulsory voting, concurrent European and 
national elections and (because of the latter) somewhat differently formulated survey questions 
with respect to choice in national elections. Moreover, necessary information was missing from 
the Belgian and Lithuanian questionnaires in 2004. 
19 The values for the Pedersen index can be calculated (within rounding error) from Table 2 by multiplying 
the average absolute turnout effect with the number of parties, and deviding the product by 2.  
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Averages do not tell the entire story and there are, of course, instances of 
individual parties that are strongly hurt (or advantaged) by differences in turnout. 
But such cases are few and fat between. In some 80% of the cases does the 
absolute value of the estimated turnout effect not exceed 2%, and for less than 
5% of the cases does it exceed a magnitude of 5%, and all these cases have 
been estimated for a drop in turnout that is far larger than between national 
elections. As a consequence, the occasions in which a party is strongly hurt or 
advantaged by historically observed declines in turnout in national elections are 
very rare. The first conclusion from these analyses is thus quite straightforward: 
lower levels of turnout in national elections by themselves will rarely have 
important effects on parties’ shares of the vote. This is even the case in those 
situations where a direct comparison of behavior (or of behavioral intentions) of 
the mutually exclusive groups of voters and non-voters in European elections 
show statistically significant contrasts (see our discussion about the information 
for CDU-CSU in Table 1, above). This is only counter-intuitive if one unwittingly 
confuses levels of analyses —the individual and the aggregate level— and if one 
does not consciously look at the arithmetic involved. In most cases the necessary 
conditions are not met for really strong turnout effects to occur. Those would 
require contrasts between the preferences of voters and non-voters of a 
magnitude that are exceedingly unlikely to be found short of electoral boycotts or 
civil war.20 In short: the conditions in which turnout effects could reach politically 
dramatic magnitudes are exceedingly rare. This is not to say that there will never 
be instances in which a party is significantly affected by changes in turnout. After 
all, the averages in Table 2 tell only part of the story, and occasionally we do see 
a party that is really advantaged or hurt by the low levels of turnout that occur in 
European elections. Yet, when looking from a more global perspective, we must 
conclude that drastic drops in turnout contribute only a small part to the overall 
levels of electoral change that normally occur, and that smaller variations in 
                                                 
20 That such large contrasts are quite unlikely can be deduced from the low levels of explained 
variance in electoral participation that are commonplace in the literature —R2’s in excess of 0.25 
are quite rare— and moreover from the fact that variables related to party preference feature 
usually weakly in such analyses.  
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turnout levels —which are the norm when comparing first-order national elections 
with one another— have electoral consequences that are usually close to 
irrelevant.  
 
 
Explanatory analyses 
 
The small magnitude of the turnout effects that we estimated does not imply that 
they are the same for different kinds of parties. In order to explore this we 
conducted a series of multilevel and OLS regression analyses, the results of 
which we will summarize below.21 The cases in this analysis are the parties that 
we can distinguish in each year, yielding n´s of approximately 400, dependent on 
the exact specifications of an analysis (see below). The dependent variable is the 
turnout effect for each of these parties (see, e.g., the last column of Table 1, 
above). As independent variables we investigated various subsets of the 
following pool of independent variables:22
 
• Political locations of parties  
In order to determine whether parties´ political stances affect their 
susceptibility to turnout effects, we included for each party its position on 
two different dimensions. One was the left/right dimension, the other a 
                                                 
21 OLS is not the most appropriate method of analysis, yet, in our view, adequate in this case. 
One problem is, of course, that the cases —parties— are not independent observations in view of 
the fact that turnout effects across all parties sum to zero by necessity. This problem is mitigated 
by two circumstances. The first is that we only include in the analyses those parties that have 
seats in the national and/or European parliament. The remaining parties are excluded, which 
removes some of the otherwise deterministic dependencies between the cases. The second 
problem is that the structure of the data would actually require multi-level analysis, with years, 
countries and parties as different levels of analysis. Such an analysis is hampered by the small 
number of units at the higher levels of analysis (countries and especially time points). Performing 
a two-level analysis (parties grouped within countries) yields no substantively different outcomes 
than our OLS analysis. The small number of time-points – three – precludes a three-level analysis 
of parties grouped within years within countries. With OLS we risk underestimating standard 
errors at the higher levels of analysis, increasing the chance of false positives. Our negative 
finding (see main text, below) that no variables at the higher levels have significant effects is 
therefore not endangered by the bias in the standard errors —on the contrary. 
22 It is obvious that not all of these variables could be included simultaneously in a regression 
model.  
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pro/anti European integration dimension.23 In addition, we calculated the 
extremity of parties’ position on these dimensions, being (within each of 
the countries) the absolute distance between the (interpolated) median 
position of a party and the position of the median voter on the same 
dimension.  
• Party family  
Dummy indicators representing party families were included. The following 
party families were distinguished: Christian-Democrats, Social Democrats, 
Greens, extreme left parties and extreme right parties, as well as an ‘other’ 
category (which comprised mainly liberal parties). Conventional wisdom 
has it that Christian-Democratic parties are thought to benefit from low 
turnout, while Social-Democratic parties are thought to suffer.  
• The political ‘weight’ of a party 
Party size (the percentage of votes in the previous national parliamentary 
elections) and a government/opposition dummy both reflect parties´ 
importance in the national political arena. Large parties and government 
parties typically fare worse in European elections; these variables allow us 
to assess to which extent this is reflected in turnout effects for national 
elections (when assessing the consequences of a drop in turnout to the 
level of a European election).   
• Position of the European election within the national election cycle.  
This variable indicates the timing of the interviews in the domestic 
electoral cycle. Although we do not investigate party choice in European 
elections —for which this temporal location has repeatedly be shown to be 
of importance24— it could be argued that such timing is also of importance 
for intended choice in national elections when this is asked outside an 
actual national election context. In the analyses, the electoral cycle is 
standardized to correct for differences in term length between countries, 
                                                 
23 Parties’ positions were indicated by the interpolated median of respondents´ perceptions, which 
is less subject to the centripetal effect of measurement error than the mean (cf Van der Eijk 2001: 
339). Parties´ positions on the pro/anti European integration dimension were not available for all 
parties in 1994 and for the Swedish parties in 2004. 
24 Cf. Oppenhuis et al. (1996), Franklin (forthcoming). 
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and runs from zero to one. Zero indicates that the EP elections were held 
‘the day after’ national parliamentary elections, while ‘1’ indicates that both 
elections are held concurrently. 
• Unique party electorate 
This variable indicates the extent to which a party’s potential electorate 
overlaps with that of other parties (cf. Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1991; 
Marsh 2005). An unpopular party whose potential electorate overlaps 
largely with other parties may see its voters defect to other parties rather 
than stay home. Conversely, parties with a comparatively large ‘unique’ 
electorate are more likely to be affected by variations in turnout, as many 
of its supporters have no other alternatives than voting for ‘their’ party or 
abstaining.  
• Government approval 
This variable was included on the basis of the reasoning that unpopularity 
of a government may give rise to (negative) turnout effects for government 
parties. Therefore it was interacted with the government/opposition 
dummy.   
• All 2-way interactions between the variables mentioned above.  
 
Modelling the impact of these independent variables is complicated by severe 
heteroscedasticity in the data. This reflects that, ceteris paribus, turnout effects 
are bound by the variations in turnout at the aggregate level. Large turnout 
effects are only possible when the difference between turnout in national and in 
European elections is large.25 ) will by necessity generate smaller turnout effects 
than large declines. This problem can be solved in a number of ways, three of 
which we used for estimating exeplanatory models.26 The first is to include as 
independent variable in regression models the drop in turnout from a national 
                                                 
25 The limiting case is a zero decline in turnout, which by necessity yields zero turnout effects.  
26 Yet other ways to handle heteroscdasticity include data transformation, and various forms of 
GLS or WLS. 
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election to the subsequent European election.27 A second possibility to model the 
heteroscedasticity is to specify a fixed-effects model by including dummies for 
countries and election years.28 A third possibility is the application of quasi-
likelihood estimation, which may be appropriate for the kind of dependent 
variable that we analyse (cf. Papke & Wooldridge 1996). We used each of these 
approaches and found that they all lead to the same substantive conclusions. We 
will therefore only report results of the first of these approaches.29
We report in Table 3 the outcomes of a series of regression analyses that 
assess whether particular kinds of parties are systematically advantaged or hurt if 
turnout in national elections declines below its normal level. The dependent 
variable is turnout effect, measured in the manner explicated above. One way to 
distinguish between different parties is by means of party families —
operationalized with dummy variables for Christian-Democratic, Social-
Democratic, Green, Extreme-Left and Extreme-Right parties, while using the 
group of ‘other’ (mainly consisting of liberal and conservative parties) as 
reference. A different way is by looking at parties’ position on ideological or 
policy-related dimensions, which makes it possible to take into account that 
members of a party family are not fully homogeneous in ideological terms. Of 
these dimensions, only the Left/Right dimension yielded significant effects in 
some of the models; the pro/anti EU integration dimension was not significantly 
related with turnout effect in any of the numerous models we evaluated, and is 
therefore not included in the models that we report. All models in Table 3 (and all 
models that are not explicitly reported) included as a correction for 
heteroskedasticity the difference in turnout between the European election in 
question and the most recent previous national parliamentary election (see our 
discussion above).  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
27 Because turnout effects can be positive as well as negative, we attributed the same sign as the 
value of the dependent variable to this independent variable.  
28 We feel that this solution is less suitable because it loses almost all statistical power to test the 
significance of the coefficients of the independent variables of substantive interest. 
29 We prefer the first of these alternatives also because it substantively specifies the origin and 
the nature of the heteroscedasticity that was observed in the data, whereas the other procedures 
are substantively less informed and rather mechanical. 
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As a baseline for comparison we report one model in which only one 
independent variables is included: the correction for heteroskedasticity (Model I). 
Model II adds the set of party family dummies, Model III adds Left/Right position 
and Left/Right extremity of parties as independent variables. Model IV, finally, 
drops from Model III the dummies for the mainstream party families and (because 
of multicollinearity) Left/Right extremity of parties.  
Model I —which includes only the variable that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity— is of little substantive interest, but functions as a baseline for 
assessing the explanatory value of the subsequent models. Its explanatory power 
(.44) indicates that almost half of the total variance is heteroskedastic in nature. 
Only the excess over this value of substantively more interesting models 
indicates the extent to which different kinds of parties are systematically 
advantaged or hurt by declining turnout.  
Model II shows that —compared to liberals, conservatives and other 
parties which constitute the reference group— only Social-Democrats are 
significantly hurt by declining turnout.30 How small the systematic differences 
between party families are, is clearly indicated by the R2, which is only .015 in 
excess of Model I. Adding parties’ Left/Right position and extremity (Model III) 
adds no more than.020 to the explanatory power of the model. It is obvious that 
party family and Left/Right measures are to some extent multicollinear, which 
calls for some caution in interpreting significance. Model III suggests that how 
parties are affected by declining turnout is dependent on their ideological 
position, with rightwing parties profiting somewhat from declining turnout, and 
leftwing parties being hurt. This relationship is not perfectly linear, however, as 
the effect is to some extent suppressed for Extreme-Right parties. Model III also 
suggests that it is the extremity of party families (what is known as the ‘extreme’ 
left and right) that matters rather than the extremity of individual parties. These 
suggestions lead to Model IV, which has the same explanatory power as Model 
III but which is more parsimoneous  
                                                 
30 It should be kept in mind that the significance of effects of party family dummies is dependent 
on which group is taken as reference category. It is therefore that the coefficients of all dummies 
should be inspected in conjunction.  
 18
In addition to the independent variables included in Models I-IV, we 
assessed several other variables (listed earlier), either by themselves or 
interacted with each other or with any of the independents in these models. None 
of these other independent variables or their interactions came close to yielding 
significant effects.  
Less than 3% explained variance is added by the characterization of 
parties in terms of left/right position and extremity and in terms of party family.  
Right-wing parties benefit somewhat from declining turnout, but this advantage is 
muted for extreme-right parties. Left-wing parties are somewhat hurt by declining 
turnout. Leftwing parties suffer (somewhat) from declining turnout —but this is not 
the case for the Extreme Left.  
The fact that parties of the right fare (slightly) better than those of the left 
when turnout declines fits with common findings from individual-level analyses of 
electoral participation that religious people (who preponderantly support right-
wing rather than left-wing parties) are somewhat more likely to turn out and vote 
than others (cf Oppenhuis 1995: 191).31    
The overall conclusion must be, however, that all substantively interesting 
effects are exceedingly weak. Although some parties do appear to be slightly 
advantaged while others are hurt somewhat by declining turnout, these effects 
are too weak to support any strong conclusions about parties’ political profiles on 
the one hand and their susceptibility to losses because of declining turnout on the 
other hand.  
 
 
Turnout effects in European Elections 
 
Because of the obvious political significance of first-order elections, we focused 
so far on the effects of declining turnout for parties´ vote shares in national 
                                                 
31 Other aspects of people’s socio-economic location that are related to left versus right 
preferences (class, union membership and income) are less clearly related to electoral 
participation and provide therefore no adequaste basis for interpreting the small effects reported 
in Table 3 (see Oppenhuis 1995:191).  
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elections. We did so by assessing how national Parliamentary vote shares would 
change if turnout would be reduced from normal levels to that of European 
Parliament elections.  But the question of turnout effects can, of course, also be 
addressed with respect to parties´ vote shares in European elections themselves: 
how would parties´ vote shares change if turnout in European elections were at 
the same level as in national elections? Unfortunately, non-voters were not asked 
how they would have voted for the European Parliament had they turned out 
rather than abstained. Therefore we have to resort to an indirect approach. Our 
data show that the party choices of those who voted in the European elections 
often deviate from what they would have voted in national elections.32 When 
assuming that this pattern of deviations would also apply to non-voters in 
European elections (while controling for party preference for first-order elections), 
we can estimate the distribution of the votes that were not cast in the European 
election but that would have been at a higher level of turnout.33 In a similar 
fashion as was illustrated in Table 1, above, we subsequently estimate turnout 
effects in the European election and analyze their relationship with the same 
independent variables as described above. Although these estimates of turnout 
effects are not identical to the ones analyzed above for first-order national 
elections, they nevertheless lead to the same substantive conclusions. Turnout 
effects are generally of the same order of magnitude, and show very little 
systematic connection to independent variables of substantive interest.  
 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
The main findings of this paper are twofold. First, the political effects of variations 
in turnout are generally small in both national and European elections in the 
member states of the EU. The effects we estimated would occur in first-order 
elections were turnout to drop from its normal national level to that of European 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Mackie et al. 1996; van Egmond forthcoming.  
33 This procedure has been applied and described in more detail by van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 
(1991) and Oppenhuis et al. (1996). 
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Parliament elections. These effects are likely to be smaller yet in all countries, 
where turnout varies considerably less between successive national elections. 
Second, the effects that differences in turnout exert on parties´ vote shares are 
virtually unrelated to substantively interesting characteristics of parties or 
contexts.  
The first of these findings —small magnitude of turnout effects— may 
seem surprising in view of the often non-negligible differences between party 
preferences of voters and abstainers that seem to provide prima facie plausibility 
to the notion that parties are affected differentially by declines (or, for that matter, 
by increases) in turnout. Yet, this finding should not be surprising at all. Analyses 
of electoral participation —why some people vote and others abstain— almost 
invariably yield weak explanations; levels of explained variance rarely exceed 
25%, and are often considerably lower. Such weak relationships cannot but 
produce weak turnout effects at best. Moreover, differences in party preferences 
between voters and abstainers often look impressive when inspected in terms of 
percentage differences, but that is particularly so because that is what we tend to 
focus on: differences. The usually much more impressive base of concordance 
between such distributions is visually more difficult to detect.34 And finally, when 
thinking of what consequences changes in turnout would have for parties’ 
strengths, it is easy to forget that such consequences do not derive only from the 
contrast between the party preferences of voters and abstainers. The question is 
how much a distribution of vote shares changes when cases are added to or 
taken out from a given base. Politically significant turnout effects require —at 
least in relatively proportional electoral systems35— much stronger differences 
                                                 
34 Consider, for example, the distributions of intended party choice of EE-voters and EE-non-
voters as reported in Table 1, above. 38.3% of non-voters chose CDU/CSU, while 53.2% of the 
EE-voters do so. The almost 15% difference is striking, but it is dwarfed by the agreement in this 
respect (38.3%) between these two groups, which is over twice as large. 
35 The political impact of turnout effects is rather straightforward in proportional systems. It is less 
so in majoritarian systems, although the magnitude of the effects documented in Table 2, above, 
would in those systems only be politically consequential if they occurred at that particular 
distribution of party support where they could affect which party will hold a majority in parliament. 
We may however venture the assumption that our findings also apply within constituencies, which 
would imply that turnout effects are likely to be politically significant in first-by-the-post systems if 
the race has a neck-to-neck character. It should also be understood that in presidential elections 
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between voters and abstainers than we observe, and also very large changes in 
turnout. Such conditions can, of course, occur, but they are not very frequent in 
established political systems.  
 The small average magnitude of turnout effects should not obscure the 
fact that occasionally a party seems indeed to be advantaged or hurt significantly 
by changes in turnout. But such cases are few and far between. Moreover, the 
finding that turnout effects are virtually unrelated to a number of party 
characteristics implies that these relatively rare cases have to be explained in 
other —more idiosyncratic— terms.36  
 Our findings imply that outcomes of elections, and the changes from 
previous elections, usually cannot be explained away by invoking alleged 
differential effects of changes in turnout. There is much more reason to see such 
changes in parties’ strengths as the consequence of changes in the electorate’s 
preferences, partly caused by generational replacement, partly by individuals 
switching between parties. Levels of turnout may generate concerns when they 
are low —as is often the case for European elections— or when they are 
declining. But these concerns can only be motivated from the normative 
perspective that all citizens should vote. Until now, however, there seems to be 
little reason for the concern that declining levels of turnout diminish the efficiency 
of elections as channels to express the distribution of party preferences in a 
population.37  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
small turnout effects can indeed have very large political consequences, but again only if they 
happen at a pivotal distribution of support for the candidates. 
36 Surveys rarely yield information on party characteristics that may give rise to the few cases of 
non-negligible turnout effects, such as serious splits and conflicts within party leadership, 
unusually charismatic party leaders.  
37 Obviously, our analyses support this conclusion only for the 1989-2004 period and for the 
states that at that time were members of the EU. The major findings from comparative research 
on elections and voting leads us to believe, however, that they are equally relevant for other 
years and for other consolidated liberal democracies.  
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Table 1: Individual observations and estimated turnout effects — Germany 
1999 
 Intended NE behavior  
Percentages  
NE Vote shares Turnout 
effect 
 EE non-
voters 
EE 
voters 
Total EE non-
voters 
EE 
voters 
Total  
CDU/CSU 38.3 53.2 47.2 49.2 54.5 52.6 -1.9 
SPD 30.9 29.1 29.8 39.7 29.8 33.2 3.4 
B90/Gr 3.9 6.2 5.3 5.0 6.4 5.9 -0.5 
FPD 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.0 -0.2 
Republikaner 2.9 4.9 4.1 3.7 5.0 4.6 -0.5 
PDS 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 -0.1 
Other parties 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.8  
Would not 
vote 
22.2 2.4 10.2     
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
(n)  (311) (468) (779) (242) (457) (699)  
Note: data based on weighted sample (EES 1999) 
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Table 2: Average absolute turnout effect per country by election year 
  
 
# of parties 
Average absolute  
turnout effect 
Political consequences 
(Pederson index) 
 1989 1994 1999 2004 1989 1994 1999 2004 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Austria   5 4   1.7 1.6   4.3 3.2 
Belgium1 6/6 6/5 6/5 na 0.5 0.3 0.2 na 1.4 0.8 0.7 na 
Cyprus    4    1.6    3.2 
Czech Rep.    7    1.5    5.4 
Denmark 9 10 12 7 1.3 1.7 0.5 1.9 6.0 8.3 2.7 6.5 
Estonia    6    2.9    8.6 
Finland   7 8   2.1 1.5   7.5 5.9 
France 6 5 9 7 1.5 0.6 0.3 2.3 4.4 1.6 1.4 8.1 
Germany 5 5 5 5 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.8 4.1 
Great Britain 3 5 9 7 1.3 1.1 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.8 13.5 8.8 
Greece 5 5 5 5 0.0 0.5 0.2 1.6 0.1 1.2 0.5 4.0 
Hungary    4    1.2    2.4 
Ireland 6 6 8 7 0.7 2.0 1.1 1.3 2.0 5.9 4.6 4.5 
Italy 8 16 17 14 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.2 2.2 2.2 6.1 
Latvia    9    1.0    4.6 
Netherlands 6 7 7 9 1.2 2.7 2.6 1.9 3.7 9.6 9.2 8.6 
Poland    8    2.6    10.3 
Portugal 5 4 5 4 0.9 1.6 1.1 1.3 2.2 3.3 2.8 2.5 
Slovakia    7    3.4    11.8 
Slovenia    8    3.7    14.9 
Spain 7 6 6 5 0.4 0.9 0.3 3.7 1.2 2.6 0.8 9.3 
Sweden   7 8   2.2 3.0   7.6 12.2 
average     0.8 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.4 3.7 4.3 6.9 
1: # of parties in Flanders and Wallonia respectively 
 
 
Table 3: Regressions of turnout effects 
 
   Model I     Model II     Model III     Model IV   
  B Beta Sig. B Beta Sig. B Beta Sig. B Beta Sig. 
(Constant) -0.075   0.377 0.153   0.226 -1.031   0.027 -1.302   0.000
Decline in turnout NE to EE 0.053 0.667 0.000 0.050 0.633 0.000 0.050 0.625 0.000 0.051 0.643 0.000
Christian Democratic party       0.340 0.044 0.262 0.563 0.073 0.068       
Social Democratic party       -0.778 -0.128 0.002 -0.317 -0.053 0.295       
Green party       -0.556 -0.074 0.059 -0.127 -0.016 0.716       
Extreme left party       -0.320 -0.050 0.206 0.183 0.029 0.707 0.729 0.115 0.019
Extreme right party       -0.437 -0.047 0.219 -1.090 -0.116 0.016 -0.990 -0.106 0.015
Party left-right position             0.144 0.146 0.052 0.222 0.225 0.000
Extremity of party left-right position             0.129 0.074 0.169       
Adjusted R-square  (N)   0.44 (394)   0.46 (394)   0.48 (372)   0.48 (372) 
Dependent Variable: Turnout effect (%)                        
[negative values=lower vote share with declining turnout]          
             
 
 
